ANTIFA vs. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION (Mock memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive Relief )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
ANTIFA vs. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
Mock memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive Relief (in response to: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/18/trump-says-he-plans-to-designate-antifa-a-major-terrorist-group )
I. INTRODUCTION
This case arises from the Executive’s unprecedented attempt to designate Antifa a “domestic terrorist group.” Such action is not only unauthorized by statute, but it also strikes at the heart of the First Amendment by criminalizing association with a political movement. Antifa is not a formal organization; it is an ideological tendency expressed through diffuse networks and protected speech. The designation is therefore ultra vires, unconstitutionally vague, and fatally defective under the Constitution’s guarantees of free expression, due process, and equal protection.
II. LACK OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Congress has expressly authorized the designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under 8 U.S.C. § 1189. No parallel statute permits the designation of domestic movements. The Executive cannot invent new powers by fiat. Any such designation would exceed statutory authority and must be struck down. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (executive cannot seize authority not delegated by Congress).
III. FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
1. Freedom of Association
Punishing individuals for identifying with or participating in “Antifa”
impermissibly burdens protected association. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (liability for group activity requires proof of
specific intent to further unlawful aims).
2. Freedom of Speech
Advocacy of political resistance, even when radical, is protected unless it
meets the stringent Brandenburg test — i.e., directed to inciting
imminent lawless action and likely to produce it. Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969). The government cannot suppress abstract political
expression.
IV. VOID FOR VAGUENESS
The Due Process Clause prohibits statutes that are so vague “that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.” Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). Because “Antifa” lacks formal structure, leadership, or membership rolls, citizens cannot know what conduct or association subjects them to criminal liability. The designation invites arbitrary enforcement and fails constitutional scrutiny.
V. SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT & EQUAL PROTECTION
Designating “Antifa” while ignoring demonstrably organized and violent far-right groups (e.g., Proud Boys, Oath Keepers) constitutes viewpoint discrimination and violates the Equal Protection Clause. Government cannot selectively criminalize political expression based on ideology. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
VI. FEDERALISM CONCERNS
The federal government cannot outlaw entire categories of domestic political movements. Criminal law and police powers are primarily state responsibilities. Federal statutes targeting terrorism apply only to specific criminal acts, not broad ideological tendencies. Expanding federal power here would erode the Constitution’s balance between state and federal authority.
VII. CONCLUSION
The attempted designation of “Antifa” as a domestic terrorist group is unauthorized, unconstitutional, and dangerous to the survival of democratic freedoms. It criminalizes ideas rather than acts, punishes association rather than conduct, and vests in the Executive a power that Congress has never granted.
For these reasons, this Court should enjoin the government from enforcing or promulgating such a designation.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Plaintiffs
