Immigration is NOT a *metaphysical problem*
To call the question of immigration “metaphysical at its core” is already to misconstrue both metaphysics and politics. It is, in fact, a false metaphysical question—a political fallacy masquerading as an ontological one.
As Aristotle made clear in the Categories, substance (ousia) is primary, while accidents are contingent predicates of substance. To divide humanity (anthropos) into ontologically distinct blocs—as if “nation” or “race” were separate substances—is to confuse accident with essence, species with differentia, and to place genus before species. Such a claim is incoherent: it asserts multiple humanities, rather than one humanity manifesting in accidental differences.
Moreover, “nation” is not a natural genus but a fabricated category: a juridico-political construct born of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, institutionalizing sovereignty and reifying the “nation-state” as a historical artifact, not an ontological reality. Likewise, “race” is not a metaphysical universal but a pseudo-scientific residue of colonial taxonomy. Francisco Suárez, in his Disputationes Metaphysicae, already warned against confusing universals of reason with universals of reality—and “nation” or “race” clearly belong to the former.
Modern critiques have only sharpened this point. Michel Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics shows how categories like race and nation are instruments of governance, techniques of power masquerading as metaphysical givens. They are “regimes of truth,” not ontological substances.
Therefore, to treat immigration as a metaphysical question collapses at every level. The true metaphysical universal is humanity itself, indivisible in substance. Immigration is not a metaphysical problem but a political-administrative one, framed within historical accidents. To mistake it for metaphysics is to commit a category error: confusing ideological constructs with ontological realities.
Thus, the assertion that immigration is metaphysical is not only false, but incoherent: it mistakes fiction for substance, material power for ontology.
